The Internet of Things is growing at a dramatic rate and extending into various application domains. We have designed, implemented and evaluated a resilient and decentralized system to enable dynamic IoT choreographies. We applied it to maintaining the functionality of building automation systems, so that new devices can appear and vanish on-the-fly.
We approach these challenges by semantically-annotated descriptions for the abstract structure and runtime state of IoT configurations. We call these descriptions recipes consisting of ingredients that interact by exchanging data. Furthermore, we enable the specification of constraints on recipes to influence the automated selection of suitable offerings for the instantiation of a recipe. To make the system scalable, we execute recipes as a distributed and autonomous choreography of offerings rather than a centralized orchestration. To ensure reliability, we design a mechanism that detects failures in the distributed system and recovers from those failures dynamically. Finally, we evaluate our implementation of the approach through an application demonstration and test the scalability through simulations. This work builds up on our previous works on semantically-enabled IoT device composition [3] , [4] and marks a further milestone on our continued research path.
RELATED WORK
Today, when new devices are added to a building automation system (BAS), they need to be connected physically, and the software on the centralized controller needs to be reparametrized and reconfigured. This task requires substantial effort and profound expertise [5] . As a consequence, it is not possible to enable dynamic behavior in such a traditional BAS.
To overcome these deficiencies, Butzin et al. [6] recognize the need for a common model and use semantic modelling to describe the data offered by devices and to realize the BAS using a service oriented approach. Butzin et al. do not focus on dynamic behavior. Thuluva et al. [7] employ Semantic Web technologies to enable low-effort engineering of automation systems. Their Industry 4.0 approach could be transferred to BAS. However, they do not focus on the runtime aspects and dynamic reconfiguration or failure detection yet. Focusing on building automation, Ruta et al. [8] present a multi-agent framework that enhances the EIB-KNX standard using semantic technologies. The authors make use of automated reasoning for enabling device discovery and orchestration of building automation components. A central mediator is used to act as broker between users and devices (e.g. home appliances). Their approach misses to address failure handling.
Our system composes different services offered by web-enabled IoT offerings together to form an application. The composition of SOAP-and REST-based web services has been extensively researched [9] . Thereby, web service composition can be classified into two types, service orchestration and service choreography, based on the manner in which the participant services interact [10] . Applications in the web-services composition field generally follow the orchestration approach, and do not cover reliability facets. Khan et al. [11] propose a reliable IoT infrastructure, but focus on communication of data instead of application-level orchestrations.
In Thuluva et al. [3] the concept of recipes has been introduced to represent the design of an IoT service composition separate from its implementation. They provide a semi-automated service composition and instantiation tool in order to assist the user in creating the composition of placeholders for actual offerings in order to replace these placeholders with actual offerings later based on suggestions provided by the system using semantic reasoning. However in the end, an application script is generated, which is run by a centralized orchestrator.
Commercially successful systems such as "If This Then That" (available at ifttt.com) and Node-RED (available at nodered.org) use simple flow-based composition techniques similar to the recipe context, but create and execute centralized orchestrations instead of decentralized choreographies. The platforms also lack systematic engineering support leading to widely duplicated recipes, as shown by Ur [12] . Giang et al. [13] focus on application-level distributed choreographies by building on Node-RED as a visual programming tool. However, they do not address the configuration of critical automation systems and their need for failure detection and recovery.
Related to this work, but focusing on cloud management, there has been much research in the field of site reliability engineering (SRE). Using containers and virtualization technology, reliability of cloud-hosted applications can be ensured [14] . SRE research is strongly focused on cloud applications, and is not directly applicable to the implementation of automation systems. Lightweight virtualization approaches such as unikernels allow using this technology in con-strained environments as well [15] , but are not integrated into a higher-level application development environment yet.
Another area related to our work is software-defined networking (SDN) and network function virtualization (NFV) approaches. These have been proposed to improve IoT system reliability [16] , [17] . However, these approaches only deal with network-level concerns and lack integration with higher-level application development tools as we propose here.
DYNAMIC DISCOVERY, DISTRIBUTION AND CONFIGURATION
Today, IoT devices are typically composed by a central entity as an orchestration. The central entity, which is typically hosted in the cloud, schedules and calls different device and service functions. Such an orchestration entails a single point of failure, as well as latency, network and privacy disadvantages. Our system instead forms the components into a choreography, where devices speak to each other directly, without going through a third party. This takes advantage of the growing "smartness" of automation devices, and aims to partly mitigate the dependency on a single centralized orchestration point.
At the heart of our system, we use the recipe concept to represent the abstract structure of IoT device interactions [3] . A recipe describes the dataflow between devices through ingredients and interactions, as shown in Figure 1 . Ingredients represent a class of devices or services through a semantic category and a number of inputs and outputs that carry data type information. The category describes the kind of thing that this ingredient represents. Using semantic concepts, the category description can be made as fine-or coarse-grained as desired. The inputs and outputs describe the type of data that this offering requires for operation, and the results of the offering's operation. Interactions describe the data flow between offering inputs and outputs, and must take place between offering inputs and outputs with matching types. When an offering receives a set of complete inputs, a computation or measurement is executed. The result of this computation is sent to the outputs, and along the interaction edge to the next offering's inputs.
Recall that a recipe only represents a template for a system. Ingredients represent placeholders for concrete devices or services. In order to operate, a recipe needs to be instantiated, which means that these placeholders need to be replaced with actual services or devices. We call these services or devices offerings and the process of replacing ingredients with offerings instantiating a recipe.
Offerings are described similarly to ingredients (category, inputs and outputs), but additionally contain implementation information that allows offerings to fulfill their functionality. For example, an office light offering would contain a REST endpoint and a payload description that allows turning the light on or off. Additionally, offerings contain non-functional information about their current state (such as location or administrative information), as opposed to functional information (inputs, outputs, category and implementation).
An offering can only replace an ingredient if its inputs, outputs and category match those of the ingredient. In addition, we provide a way to restrict the replacement in a more powerful way: Offering selection rules (OSRs) describe additional requirements on an offering's non-functional properties that must be met in order for the offering to be considered for an ingredient's replacement [4] . All non-functional properties of offerings can be restricted. Additionally, the cardinality of an ingredient can be limited. Cardinality restrictions allow limiting the number of offerings that replace an ingredient between a minimum and maximum value.
Another important concept is the recipe runtime configuration (RRC), which contains information about a specific instance of a recipe. Recipes may be instantiated multiple times, possibly with different OSRs, and each instantiation forms a new RRC. The process of selecting offerings that fulfill the requirements to be part of a recipe is called offering discovery. In this process, the matching of category as well as input and output types of an ingredient in the RRC is determined. This process strongly relies on the semantic annotation of the descriptions of offerings and recipes. Figure 2 shows the instantiation of a recipe into an RRC for a simple light control recipe. The ingredients on the left are replaced with offerings that match their semantic category, as well as the types of their inputs and outputs. In this example, the general scheme for a light control service is instantiated with concrete devices, and is ready to fulfill its functionality. Using these concepts, we have built a system that enables (1) the specification of recipes in a graphical user interface (the recipe editor), (2) browsing and viewing of recipes, (3) creating and modify RRCs, and (4) building executable choreographies from RRCs. Figure 2 provides an overview of the interplay of components that realize this functionality. The controller shown at the center of the system is the management component hosting the graphical interfaces (described in more detail in Thuluva et al. [3] ), as well as supporting the creation of choreographies from recipes. For persistence and semantic operations, the controller accesses a semantic database (a triple store).
The engine is a piece of software hosted on smart devices that allows the running of choreographies. Each engine carries a description of the offering it provides (the so-called offering description) and provides an interface to realize the operation of choreographies. Controller and engine work together to enable the running of distributed choreographies generated from RRCs. When an engine is added to the network or configuration of the engine changes, it registers at the controller with its offering description. The controller then runs the offering discovery process, finding all RRCs that the newly added engine should be part of. From the recipe corresponding to the RRC, the controller derives all offerings that the engine should communicate with. This communication information is encoded into a so-called interaction descriptor (InDes) for each engine part of the RRC and distributed.
An example interaction descriptor for a switch component in the lighting control recipe is shown in Listing 1. Besides the meta-information in the offering and RRC keys, the inputs and outputs key contain the information necessary for the engine to realize the choreography. In this case, they specify that the switch should send its output called on_off to the light's input called switch_in, and accept no inputs. The monitors section plays a central role in the reliability mechanism, which we discuss in the next section. Listing 1: Example of an interaction descriptor sent to a switch 'Switch1' to control a light Using the mechanism described above, a choreography is created and run. The engine receives input data (sent via HTTP PUT requests encoded as JSON data), and transfers that data to the implementing service or device. The service creates new output that the engine again encodes as JSON and sends to the REST endpoints described in the output section of its interaction descriptor. Once the choreography is created, the controller is no longer required, and the functionality described by the recipe is provided by offerings without centralized coordination.
FAILURE DETECTION
As outlined above, choreographies have clear advantages over centralized compositions. However, by minimizing the role of a centralized component, detection of component failures becomes more challenging. In the case of running choreographies for automation systems or the IoT, a mechanism for failure detection is especially important, as failures have a more severe impact and are more likely compared to traditional web services.
Hence, our aim is to ensure that the failure of a choreography is detected and the failed choreography is recovered, so that services can be provided by our system with minimal downtime. Factors that can make a choreography fail are a) the failure of offerings and b) the failure of communication links between those offerings. To detect this failure and to be able to react to failures in a timely manner, we have evaluated two reliability checking approaches, centralized and decentralized.
The centralized failure detection approach reflects a naïve approach that we use for benchmarking against the decentralized approach. In a nutshell, the centralized approach works by having the controller check every node in the network for reachability in a regular time interval. We call the period of this reachability check T rrc . This approach has several advantages: It is very simple to implement, and the controller has a direct global view of the current availability of the system. Additionally, on the failure of components, the controller is directly informed about failure, without additional delay introduced by intermediate nodes. However, the centralized approach also has severe disadvantages. Namely, the bandwidth and performance requirements of the centralized approach scale linearly with the number of nodes in the system, with all load centralized at the controller. Additionally, the controller alone cannot check the availability of communication links between two offerings, or differentiate the failure of a communication link between controller and offering from a failure of the offering.
To circumvent these limitations, we have developed a decentralized approach that takes advantage of the application structure to check the availability of nodes, and also allows the detection of link failures. Instead of the controller checking all devices for availability, devices check other devices that they are connected to on the application level. This reduces the load on the controller, and enables several other optimization techniques: The failure of links between nodes can be detected and heuristically resolved and node communication can be used to replace failure detection packets.
When a choreography is created or changes, a monitoring configuration is generated for each node. A monitoring configuration is generated from the RRC by adding monitoring links from each node to all nodes it communicates with. A node x that has no incoming communication link from the RRC is then monitored by node y that is selected by choosing the node with the fewest monitoring links (this will mostly be data sinks in the recipe structure) and adding it to y's monitoring links. This monitoring configuration is stored in the monitors section of the InDes (see Listing 1), and sent to the nodes whenever the choreography is updated. Offerings that are not part of a RRC are sent interaction descriptors that form a ring of nodes monitoring each other, but are not treated specially in any other way.
Then, monitoring is implemented by every node regularly connecting to all nodes in its monitors section in turn. The period of these connection attempts is again called T rrc and can be specified per RRC. When this connection attempt fails, an error message is sent to the controller with the source and target nodes of the connection, as well as the RRC the error occurred in.
This failure checking approach would not cover the failure of a complete RRC, since all nodes that would do any checking have failed. To discover this case, the controller checks one node of each RRC at regular time intervals, but with much less frequently than the inter-RRC checking takes place. We call this period T ctrl .
An example of this approach for a light control recipe is shown in Figure 3 : The recipe consists of two switches (O1 and O2) controlling lights (O3, O4 and O5). Three offerings are currently not part of a recipe (O6-O8), and thus do not exchange recipe data. Switch O1 controls all three lights, while the other switch controls only two of the lights. The straight black arrows show recipe data flow, while the red arrows show monitoring links created from this recipe data flow. It can be seen that all recipe data flows result in exactly one monitoring link being created. Additionally, backlinks are created to initial nodes of the recipe that would otherwise not have any node monitoring them. Undeployed offerings (those that are not part of a recipe) are connected into a ring by the monitoring links. This approach works for detecting node failures. However, if a link failure occurs, this will look like a node failure to the detecting node. Since it is not possible for us to detect link failure definitively without knowledge of the underlying network, we have chosen a probabilistic approach. When a node x notifies the controller of the node failure of node y, the controller checks the number of received failure messages for node y against the number of nodes that are responsible for checking the availability of that node. If all of those nodes have indicated a failure of node y, node y has failed with high probability. Additionally, the controller itself checks availability of nodes. If only a small amount of nodes have indicated failure, we posit a link failure between those nodes.
Once a failure has been detected, the available description of our desired network configuration in the form of recipes allows recovery of the functionality provided by recipes if replacement nodes are available. Link and node failures are treated differently: When a node has failed, it is removed from the RRC, and offering discovery is rerun to find a replacement node. The controller will send an interaction descriptor to the replacement node, and the choreography will run again.
In a link failure, two nodes are eligible for removal from the orchestration. We select the node with the fewest incoming and outgoing connections to replace (given availability of a replacement node), and replace it with a replacement node. If the replacement node uses the same communication links that led to the removal of the original node, we will receive a failure message, and restart the replacement algorithm with another node, until we do not receive failure messages. The high-level specification of our applications thus allows us to maintain functionality in the case of node or link failure without requiring any user interaction.
EVALUATION
We have run a simulation of the decentralized failure detection algorithm to measure the traffic distribution and bandwidth usage compared to the naïve, centralized approach described previously. We used the OMNeT++ discrete event simulator (available at www.omnetpp.org) to perform the evaluations.
Both the centralized and the decentralized approach were implemented as C++ node classes. For the naïve approach, one node was designated the controller, and all other nodes were designated offerings. Since all nodes are treated equally in the centralized approach, we did not need to differentiate between nodes in different recipes. For the distributed approach, we created two recipes (one with two nodes, one with 5 nodes, structured similarly to the recipe in Figure 3 ). For the n th run of the simulation, we instantiated the two recipes n times. Additionally, one node that was not part of a recipe was added to the simulation, resulting in n*8 total recipe nodes in the network, not including the controller. The detection periods were set to 1 second and 40 seconds for T rrc and T repo respectively. We record the total number of packages exchanged during the experiment runtime, which was 24 hours of simulation time. We assume that keepalive messages are of constant size, and have normalized the bandwidth use of a single message to 1. As expected, the repository shows high bandwidth consumption, because it needs to check each offering in the network every T rrc seconds. Load on the offerings is constantly low, because they only need to answer the controller's requests.
For the decentralized algorithm, load on the controller has decreased significantly, because it only checks one node from each RRC every T repo seconds. Note that this does not mean that failure detection time is increased: Because nodes check each other, failure detection time is exactly the same (barring network latency) as in the centralized case. Communication load on the offerings has increased. Since each offering has to check other offerings in the recipe every T rrc seconds, there is now a higher load than in the centralized case. However, that load is still constant, regardless of the total number of nodes in the network. The load on offerings depends on the size of recipes, not the total size of the network. Thus, if the network is grown by adding additional instances of recipes to the network, the load on existing offerings does not increase, and the monitoring load at the controller will grow more slowly than in the centralized case.
The differences between the offerings' network traffic visible in offering 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 stem from the differences in the total number of monitoring links. As seen in Figure 3 , O2 has three monitoring links plus the additional monitoring link from the controller, resulting in slightly more bandwidth use than offering 5, which also has three monitoring links. O1 has the highest bandwidth usage with a total of 4 monitoring links. The total number of network packages exchanged is slightly higher for the decentralized algorithm. In our simulations, we have measured a total overhead factor of 1.142. This is compensated by the improved scalability of the controller (as shown in Figure 4 ) and capability for link failure detection between nodes, which is not possible with the centralized approach.
Additionally, we have built a small application demonstration using two "switch" offerings (Raspberry Pi single board computers with attached pushbuttons) and two "light" offerings (one smart office light accessible via CoAP, and one Philips Hue light accessible via HTTP REST). We created a recipe that allows control of offerings of the category "Light" located in "Room A" from all offerings with the category "Switch" in "Room A". We also added a "maximum cardinality of 1" constraint to the switch ingredient. The two switch offerings were connected to the network, and one switch was selected for control of the lights. To see the reliability functionality in action, we then removed power to the switch currently controlling the light, and observed failover to the second switch within 15 seconds. A recording of this application example's operation accompanied with narration can be found at https://mediatum.ub.tum.de/1403134?show_id=1432951.
CONCLUSIONS
Having implemented and evaluated our reliability approach for managing dynamic IoT choreographies, we are planning to extend both the evaluation and implementation facets. On the implementation level, we plan to take advantage of software defined networking (SDN) technology to be able to replace offerings that have suffered a link failure with other offerings that we know do not share those same links for communication. Beyond reliability, we will extend the capabilities of the offering description to not only describing choreographies of web services, but allowing computation offerings as well, with features comparable to fog computing technology, i.e. being able to deploy computation offerings to a local "cloud" and being able to seamlessly migrate such computations between nodes.
On the evaluation level, we plan to extend our testing to encompass a physical model for communication to be able to gauge the energy efficiency of a distributed approach for different underlying networking technologies (such as 802.11b/g/n wireless networking, or 802.11s mesh networking).
